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MASS TORTS—MATURATION
OF LAW AND PRACTICE
Paul D. Rheingold*
I. Introduction
Mass tort litigation has been with us for about fifty years.
This is dating the start from the MER/29 litigation in 1964.1
This field of law and practice has grown year after year, and it
shows no sign of abating. At the same time, it can be said that
this area of law and procedure has reached a mature stage; the
practice is fairly standardized and earlier experiments have
either become the model or have been abandoned.
The term “mass tort litigation” (MTL), as used in this
article, confines itself to product liability personal injury cases
involving similar injuries from exposure to the same product
and resulting in multiple claimants. “Multiple” may be as
small as a hundred, but may also amount to 50,000, 100,000, or
more.2 Thus, excluded from direct examination in this paper
* Member of the New York bar; LL.B. Harvard Law School, 1958, cum laude;
author of PAUL RHEINGOLD, LITIGATING MASS TORT CASES (AAJ Press 2006). I
have participated in many tort cases discussed in this article.
1. For a discussion of the MER/29 litigation, see Paul Rheingold,
Looking Back at the First Mass Tort Drug Case, TRIAL MAG., Aug. 2014, at 26.
2. There is no list readily available of all mass torts, or the approximate
number of claimants. One of the largest groups of mass torts is the current
transvaginal mesh cases, involving well over 100,000 claimants, pending in
the District Court of West Virginia. See Shezad Malik, Vaginal Mesh Injury
Lawsuit Claims Continue, THE LEGAL EXAMINER (Feb. 8, 2017, 1:42 PM),
http://fortworth.legalexaminer.com/medical-devices-implants/vaginal-meshinjury-lawsuit-claims-continue/. Larger still are two product litigations that
both mark the early days of mass torts and continue to this day, asbestos and
tobacco. Both of these are discussed in the text below.
Other massive litigations have involved the drug Vioxx (35,000 or more
plaintiffs) and Fen-Phen, the weight loss drug combination (50,000 or more).
The Vioxx litigation is described in SNIGDHA PRAKASH, ALL THE JUSTICE
MONEY CAN BUY: CORPORATE GREED ON TRIAL (2011); and Frank M.
McClellan, The Vioxx Litigation: A Critical Look at Trial Tactics, The Tort
System, and the Role of Lawyers in Mass Tort Litigation, 57 DEPAUL L. REV.
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are consumer economic suits, often commenced in a class action
format, and toxic tort lawsuits dealing with localized pollution.
The most common product involved in mass tort litigation
in recent years has been prescription drugs, followed by
medical devices.3 Interestingly, however, the two largest mass
torts, looking back fifty years in terms of numbers of claimants,
have been asbestos4 and tobacco.5 The bulk of both of these are
in the past; however, many cases remain, in part due to the
latency of the disease these products cause.
There are some ways to catalog and distinguish between
various mass torts, which have led to some distinctions in law
and practice. One common division is between local and
widespread torts. Localized torts tend to involve a catastrophic
accident (plane crash) or a disaster, either man-made (BP oil
spill) or natural (Hurricane Katrina). It is the widespread or
national torts (a dangerous drug, for example), which have
tended to drive the legal development considered in this article.
509 (2008). For a book on the Fen-Phen litigation, see ALICIA MUNDY,
DISPENSING WITH THE TRUTH: THE VICTIMS, THE DRUG COMPANIES, AND THE
DRAMATIC STORY BEHIND THE BATTLE OVER FEN-PHEN (2011).
For more on mass tort litigation, see RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A
WORLD OF SETTLEMENT (2007). JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN
MASS TORT LITIGATION: THE EFFECT OF CLASS ACTIONS, CONSOLIDATIONS, AND
OTHER MULTIPARTY DEVICES (1995). Finally, for an outstanding casebook in
the field, see LINDA S. MULLENIX, MASS TORT LITIGATION: CASES AND
MATERIALS (2d ed. 2008).
3. Using the establishment of multidistrict litigations, the active mass
torts are divided into four categories: drugs (11), device (10), motor vehicles
(2), and other products and substances (2). See PAUL RHEINGOLD, LITIGATING
MASS TORT CASES C.15.1 (AAJ Press 2006).
4. Asbestos litigation has probably involved more than one million
workers. It had its origins in the 1980s, and reached such volumes that
courts tried to control it through class actions, a history that is reviewed
below. Asbestos litigation also led to a record number of bankruptcies,
considered below. Leading books on the topic are STEPHEN J. CARROLL ET AL.,
ASBESTOS LITIGATION (rev. ed. 2005); and JEB BARNES, DUST-UP: ASBESTOS
LITIGATION AND THE FAILURE OF COMMONSENSE POLICY REFORM (Georgetown
Univ. Press 2011).
5. Tobacco—cigarette cases—also had their litigation start in the 1980s
with class actions, which resulted in damages not awarded to individual
plaintiffs. That litigation is reviewed below, as well as Florida litigation that
spawned thousands of cases. Leading books on the topic are W. KIP VISCUSI,
SMOKE-FILLED ROOMS: A POSTMORTEM ON THE TOBACCO DEAL (2002); and
MARTHA A. DERTHICK, UP IN SMOKE: FROM LEGISLATION TO LITIGATION (CQ
Press 2001).
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Another division of the cases may be made between those
involving immediate injuries and those with substantial
periods of time passing between exposure and disease—with
so-called latent effects.6 The latter tend to raise statute of
limitations issues and also, as discussed below, monitoring
issues and identification issues (“market share”).
Mass tort litigation is as much a procedural topic as a
substantive one. While there are some law issues specific to
mass tort litigation, the greater area of development has been
in the adaptation or invention of procedural mechanisms to the
management of the cases in their organization, their
development, and their disposition. The three phases just
listed—organization, development, and disposition–form the
three main sections of this article.
Given that this article is written by a practitioner, the
analysis and writing is not of a typical academic style. An
academic analysis of this field of law is also invaluable, since it
examines
the
activities
with
a
broader,
more
philosophical/jurisprudential perspective. The footnotes do
contain citations to some of the many perceptive articles
written by law professors. Also, the final section of this article
presents a summary of how the academic world has responded
to the development of the field of mass torts.
II. Organization of Mass Torts; Role of the Judiciary
In order to manage mass torts, it is a given that they must
be congregated in some way.7 Over the course of MTL, there
have been some dramatic changes in the ways in which they
are organized, as is next considered.

6. An outstanding example of latent injury is the development
(sometimes decades later) of mesothelioma from asbestos particle inhalation.
Similarly, in the diethylstilbestrol (DES) litigation, the DES consumed by a
pregnant woman caused damage to her fetus, which was manifest only when
the child reached maturity. See Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069
(N.Y. 1989).
7. “Congregation” is used as a general, non-legal term, in avoidance of
the term “consolidation,” which has a specific meaning in the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. See FED R. CIV. P. 42.
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A. The Attempt at Using Class Actions
The largest change over time in the organization of mass
tort cases is the demise of the class action8 as a method of
congregation. In the early years of handling these cases, the
class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (F.R.C.P.)
23(b)(3) was the obvious procedural device for the organization
and control of the cases. All of the injured claimants would be
placed in one class, and they would be bound by the outcome of
the litigation. Thus, in the 1980s, and up until the decision in
1997 next discussed, class actions were certified in such cases
as Agent Orange,9 Bjork-Shiley heart valves,10 and silicone
breast implants.11
On the other hand, some courts (even back then) found
that the requirements for a class action under F.R.C.P.
23(b)(3), including commonality and superiority, were not met
and hence refused to certify a class. This was often as a result
of appellate decisions, overturning district court attempts to
create a class, which sometimes arose of desperation to find a
method of control. Examples involved tobacco,12 blood factors
(containing HIV virus),13 and the Hyatt Skywalk collapse.14
All hopes of using Rule 23(b)(3) to organize cases came to a
sudden end in 1997, by virtue of the Supreme Court decision in
the Amchem case,15 which effectively barred class actions in
tort cases. This decision came in an asbestos case where there
was a settlement class.16 Proponents of the class sought, under
F.R.C.P. 23, to differentiate it from a class action, which would
have been an original means of congregating the cases where
the lack of commonality and other requirements most likely

8. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
9. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig. MDL No. 381, 818 F.2d 145 (2d
Cir. 1987).
10. Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., 143 F.R.D. 141 (S.D. Ohio 1992).
11. In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. CV 92-P10000-S, 1994 WL 578353, at *1 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 1, 1994).
12. Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996).
13. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995).
14. In re Fed. Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir. 1982).
15. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1996).
16. Id. at 597.
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would not exist.17 Rather, they argued that there was only a
settlement class where there would be less individualizing
factors and less difficulty in management.18 The Supreme
Court, however, barred even a settlement class because of the
numerous individualizing factors among the various
claimants.19
The Amchem decision, however, left open the possibility
that a class action might be justified in the event of a “limited
fund”—insufficient money to pay the anticipated damages.20
The Supreme Court dealt with this issue three years later in
Ortiz21 Here, again, a proposed settlement of asbestos cases
involving a defendant without resources to pay full damages
was presented for approval.22 The class was formulated
pursuant to F.R.C.P 23(b)(1)(B).23
The Court, however,
disallowed such a class, based upon problems in defining the
class and in the asserted rights of individuals to have their day
in court.24
In the two decades following this duo of Supreme Court
decisions, few, if any, instances have arisen where a class was
certified in an MTL.25
B. The Turn to Multidistrict Litigation (MDL)
The congregating of mass tort cases into federal
multidistrict litigation has increasingly been the major method
of organizing cases. In 1968, Congress established a scheme of
coordinating before one judge all of the civil cases pending in
the various federal district courts where there were common
questions of fact if doing so would promote efficiency and be

17. Id. at 601-04.
18. Id. at 617.
19. See id. at 622-28.
20. Anchem, 521 U.S. at 614.
21. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
22. Id. at 827.
23. Id. at 821.
24. Id. at 864-65.
25. See In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 613 F.3d 504 (5th Cir.
2010). Nor has there been any notable success in creating a national class
action under state law. See Gen. Motors Corp. v. Bryant, 285 S.W.3d 634
(2008), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1098 (2009).
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convenient for the parties.26
The Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation, created by this law, has the
responsibility of determining if an MDL should be established
and then picking the transferee court and judge to whom all
cases will be assigned.27
Over time, the work of the transferee judges (those to
whom the Judicial Panel has sent cases) has substantially
improved in efficiency, based in part on the experiences of
judges who have successfully handled the assignment. This is
especially true with “repeat” judges, those who have multiple
mass actions assigned to them. Efficiency can be measured a
number of ways, including rapidly establishing comprehensive
procedures to handle large numbers of cases; moving cases
through discovery quickly; and bringing the cases to a
resolution.28 Faults sometimes associated with the MDL
system in mass tort cases, however, are delay in preparation
for trial and the costs paid per case for common benefit work,
both time and expenses.29
C. Mass Tort Handling in The State Court Systems
At the same time that the federal legislature has been
addressing the problem of many similar cases being filed in
various federal district courts around the country through the
use of MDL procedure, the states have similarly been adapting
26. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2016). For a full discussion of how cases are
selected for MDL and the work of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation, see RHEINGOLD, supra note 3, at C.3.
27. RHEINGOLD, supra note 3, at § 3:8.
28. See DUKE L. CTR. FOR JUD. STUD., STANDARDS AND BEST PRACTICES
LARGE AND MASS-TORT MDLS (EXECUTIVE SUMMARY) (2014),
FOR
https://law.duke.edu/sites/default/files/centers/judicialstudies/standardsbest_practices-exec_summary-final.pdf. The Center for Judicial Studies at
Duke Law School has been studying MDL practices. It has issued various
studies under the general rubric “MDL Standards and Best Practices.” See
id. It has also held forums on the topics involved. Whether there is a need
for development of standards for the courts handling multidistrict litigation
is, however, a debatable matter.
29. For example, in the 2014 NuvaRing settlement, common benefit fees
were assessed at 11% (meaning that the contingent fee of the individual
lawyer was reduced by 11 points), and the expenses at 4.5% (meaning that
the client paid 4.5% of her award to the steering committee). See RHEINGOLD,
supra note 3, at § 7:26.50. See also Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Monopolies in
Multidistrict Litigation, 70 VAND. L. REV. 67, 131 (2017).
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to mass tort suits in their courts. The need generally arises
when there are multi-county filings.
Here, however, no
uniform approach or rules have been adopted; rather, over
time, many states have developed individualized procedures for
congregating mass tort actions within their state.30 As might
be expected, some of the most advanced and comprehensive
plans are in states that have seen the most MTL. New Jersey
is a good example of a complex system, arising out of the
presence of so many pharmaceutical manufacturers.31
California is another state example of a comprehensive plan,
which assigns cases filed in various counties to one judge
statewide.32
Plaintiffs’ lawyers have been making their choices of filing
in federal versus state jurisdictions by weighing a number of
factors. Some file in state court to avoid cases involved in a
parallel MDL—perhaps to have more control or to save paying
fees and expenses in the MDL. Defendants are, of course
unhappy about being sued both in the MDL and in state court
(and often it is in multiple states), especially since this may
require multiple witness exposures and other disclosures, and
use of different state laws regarding what must be produced.
The federal-state filings of the same mass tort have
exerted pressure for coordination, if not full cooperation among
the judges assigned to the litigation. Whereas, in earlier days,
federal judges inherently felt that they should be in charge and
expected the state court judiciary to just tag along, a more
nuanced arrangement is now often achieved. The state and
federal judges communicate frequently, and may enter joint
orders. The aim is to have discovery done only once, no matter
where it is held. On occasion, however, the state court may
take the lead, having started earlier on the litigation or being
independent-minded.
Those seeking the goal of close
coordination have been helped both by the Federal Judicial

30. State court plans are discussed comprehensively in RHEINGOLD,
supra note 3, at C.4.
31. Information on the New Jersey system can be found at
www.judiciary.state.nj.us/mass-tort/index.html.
32. Information on the California coordination statute can be found in
Corber v. Xanodyne Pharms., Inc., 771 F.3d 1218 (9th Cir. 2014).
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Center33 and the National Center for State Courts.34
D. Federal Legislation Relating to Mass Tort Organization
Two federal statutes, designed to further coordinate and
federalize mass tort litigation, have been far from successful in
achieving their goals. The more significant one is the Class
Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA).35 In passing CAFA, the
aim of Congress, with regard to mass tort litigation and other
mass litigation, was to facilitate removal of state court actions
to federal court by minimizing jurisdictional requirements.36 It
was reasoned, by defendants, that if all the suits were before
one federal judge, they would be more under control.37 CAFA
legislatively created the concept of a “mass action,” defined as
one in which “monetary relief claims of 100 or more persons are
proposed to be tried jointly on the ground that the plaintiffs’
claims involve common questions of law or fact . . . .”38
Once the language was added to the CAFA bill that it is
the plaintiff who must demand a joint trial (compared to the
defendant or the court), the usefulness of the law to the latter
two entities was almost entirely undone. To avoid removal
(assuming that is the goal of the plaintiffs), plaintiffs’ lawyers
do not ask for a joint trial, even if they seek to congregate cases
for discovery purposes. And even if they represent hundreds of
clients, they file in batches of ninety-nine or less to avoid the
100 case rule. For the most part, with a decade of CAFA in
place, few mass tort cases have been successfully removed to
the federal system.39
33. There is considerable information available on the issue of state
mass tort cases and coordination with federal MDL litigation on the website
for the United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation,
www.jpml.uscourts.gov.
34. More information about this group’s work in mass torts may be
accessed at www.ncsc.org.
35. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2016).
36. RHEINGOLD, supra note 3, at § 2:3.
37. RHEINGOLD, supra note 3, at § 2:4.
38. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i).
39. Leading cases disallowing removal are Romo v. Teva Pharms. USA,
Inc., 731 F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 2013); and Anderson v. Bayer Corp., 610 F.3d 390
(7th Cir. 2010). But a few decisions have, on their facts, allowed removal.
See Atwell v. Boston Sci. Corp., 740 F.3d 1160 (8th Cir. 2013); In re Abbott
Labs., Inc., 698 F.3d 568 (7th Cir. 2012).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss2/6

8

2017

MASS TORTS

625

Another even-less-used statute relating to mass torts in
the federal system is the Multiparty, Multiforum Trial
Jurisdiction Act of 2002.40 Indeed, it is all but forgotten,
having been involved in virtually no litigation in the past
decade.
E. Other, Minor Methods of Congregation
A number of other means have been assayed in order to
manage mass torts, but none have shown any recent promise.
Therefore, they are reviewed very briefly here.
Two methods involve a combination of substantive law and
procedure. First, there is the “market share” concept: that a
group of defendants who produce the same product can be sued
collectively, each made to pay for a proportion of damages
which bears some relation to the share of the market the
particular defendant had.41 To the extent the market share
concept has found acceptance at all, it is in the very limited
situation where the product is fungible and, due to the passage
of time (for a latent injury), the particular maker can no longer
be identified.42 No recent mass tort has been managed under
this doctrine.
A second potential method is the use of the “medical
monitoring” theory: that a fund can be created for a group of
persons exposed to some toxic substance to pay costs of
monitoring their health to see if a latent disease associated
with exposure can develop.43 This method has not been well
accepted by the courts, and even at its best, could not round up
cases of persons already injured.44
More standard procedural methods of congregating cases—
consolidation of cases within one court pursuant to F.R.C.P.
42,45 or joinder of cases pursuant to F.R.C.P. 2046—have not
provided means of organizing national litigation.47
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

28 U.S.C. § 1369(a) (2016).
RHEINGOLD, supra note 3, at § 6:21.
Id.
Id. at § 2:29.
Caronia v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 5 N.E.3d 11 (N.Y. 2013).
FED. R. CIV. P. 42.
FED. R. CIV. P. 20.
RHEINGOLD, supra note 3, at C.5.
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F. Financing of MTL
The financial management of MTL has also evolved
dramatically over the years. In effect, it is now well recognized
that the plaintiffs’ lawyers who are managing the litigation
(generally a steering committee appointed by the court) “front”
the costs of the litigation. This is done by a combination of,
first, capital contributions to a common fund, to pay for such
costs as document acquisition and analysis, hiring experts, and
depositions of defendants’ employees. And there are further
large outlays that fall into the category of “retained” expenses,
where a firm pays its own expenses in doing common work. In
a way, this is no different from an individual firm with a single
case carrying the costs of the litigation, pending the outcome.
The law firms paying the expenses do so, of course, with the
intention of being reimbursed at the end of the litigation.48
Similarly, the plaintiffs’ counsel managing the litigation
provide their time, as they would in any contingent fee case,
without hourly payment from the clients.
Here, the
expectation, based upon good outcomes in prior MTLs, is that
they will be reimbursed at the end of the litigation, often at
high hourly rates if the litigation is very successful.49
The ultimate source of reimbursement, for time and
expenses, recently has come almost exclusively from the
settlement funds paid to the claimants (whether it is a lump
sum to be spread, or a per-case payment under some sort of
plan).50 The method of a settling defendant contributing
separately to a fund to pay these management costs is seldom
followed recently. In advance of the resolution of the litigation,
the MDL court will generally set percentages that will be
withheld from each settlement to pay for the expenses and the
time.51 Most recently, the expense portion has been charged to
the client, and the time portion deducted from the individual
48. See Caronia v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 715 F.3d 417 (2d Cir. 2013);
In re NuvaRing Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 4:08 MDL 1964 RWS, 2014 WL
7271959 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 18, 2014); see also RHEINGOLD, supra note 3, at
§ 7:26.50.
49. See infra note 52.
50. RHEINGOLD, supra note 3, at C.7.
51. Id.
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lawyer’s fee.52
III. Development of Mass Tort Cases Toward Trial
Once a mass of product cases have been congregated (most
likely when an MDL as has been discussed), the next step is to
prepare the cases. This is conducted as one would prepare for
trial, but it is done in the shadow of experience that most mass
torts cases, as with all litigation, are eventually disposed of by
settlement.
Certain orders and procedures have developed and have
now become routine at the start of a new congregation of cases.
These include confidentiality and protective orders; the way in
which motions will be handled, both on all-case issues and
individual cases; and a determination whether or not there can
be simplified service of complaints, or the filing of a master
complaint, with individual plaintiffs filing a short-form
complaint.53
Over time, the preparation of the cases for trial has moved
into a common pattern. As to disclosure from the plaintiffs, on
each case the defendant first will seek extensive written
responses in a specially negotiated document often known as a
Plaintiff’s Fact Statement.54
Also with this would go
production of documents the plaintiff has in hand, and
authorizations for medical records, tax records and other
documents.55
52. See Eldon E. Fallon, Common Benefit Fees in Multidistrict
Litigation, 74 LA. L. REV. 371 (2014).
53. The Federal Judicial Center has put great effort over the years into
providing advice for judges to whom mass tort actions (and other complex
actions) are assigned. See, e.g., FED. JUD. CTR, MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIG.,
FOURTH (2004),
http://www.fjc.gov/public/home.nsf/autoframe?openagent&url_l=/public/home.
nsf/inavgeneral?openpage&url_r=/public/home.nsf/pages/524.
For
more
information on its activities, one may access its website, www.fjc.gov. Some
states have similar printed advice and website sources.
54. RHEINGOLD, supra note 3, at § 8:9.
55. Id. at § 8:10. Recently, the fact statement demanded from each
plaintiff is now balanced by a similar demand from the defendant, often
known as a Defendant’s Fact Statement, which seeks information in its
possession about the plaintiff’s specific case. In drug litigation, an example
would be contacts the defendant had with the prescriber of the medicine for
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As far as disclosure from the defendant, the plaintiffs’
discovery team will, today, automatically seek the defendant’s
business records. These days, these records are almost entirely
in electronic form, and issues inevitably arise about how they
will be searched and produced. The ESI (electronically stored
information) fights are not particular to mass torts, but almost
inevitably arise and are more massive.
In mass tort work, millions of documents are routinely
provided by the defendant to the plaintiffs’ group, which must
then find a platform on which to house them, and a method to
search them. The long running task of the group is, first, to
select the documents to be used in depositions, and then to boil
them further to a list of “hot documents” for trial.
From documentary discovery (and limited use of
interrogatories), modern MDL plaintiff discovery from
defendant moves to depositions. Dozens, if not hundreds, of
depositions are taken these days of the defendant’s present and
former employees, often followed by non-party depositions,
such as of physicians who did research.
At the same time that the massive groundwork discovery
outlined above is going on, supervising judges and the parties
realize that some movement of cases to trial must be
commenced. The choice is to try all cases on specific issues, or
try some representative cases on all issues. In the latter
approach, which is almost universally used today in MTL,
bellwether cases are prepared fully for trial. That process,
which straddles both preparation and trial/resolution issues, is
discussed in the next section.
IV. Resolution: Trials and Settlements; Bankruptcy
The most significant topic to be covered in this study of the
maturation of mass tort litigation is how such litigation is
resolved. The many ways in which this may occur—trial,
settlement, summary judgment, discontinuance, even
bankruptcy—are all considered here, but as the litigation has
matured, it has become ever more a game of settlement.

the plaintiff.
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A. Ways in Which Mass Tort Cases Are Tried
When MTL was developing in the 1980s and 1990s, two
distinct methods were devised by the courts for trial of the
cases. The first was issue or phased trials: issues in the
litigation would be identified and one issue would be selected
for trial first; the outcome would bind all cases. Then, if no
settlement arose, the next issue would be tried. This process
involved bifurcation of issues. Examples of this method include
the Costano tobacco cancer cases,56 the Beverly Hills fire case,57
and the Watson oil refinery explosion case.58 It should be
noticed that most of the cases that experimented with phased
trials were within the territory of the Fifth Circuit.
In recent years, this method—trial of one issue in all
cases—has fallen into disuse. Perhaps part of the reason was
the question of what issue would be tried first. Some judges
evidently felt that the most contentious issue should be tried
first. If the plaintiff lost, that would end the litigation, and if
the plaintiff won, that might lend itself to settlement.
However, these procedures went against the grain of naturally
trying cases together on liability, causation, and damages.
Further, it was hard to find issues common to all cases to such
a degree that one jury verdict could bind all claimants.
Of course, one can try more than one plaintiff’s case at
once, but one cannot feasibly try 100 or 1000 plaintiffs’ cases at
once. Thus, the almost universal method that is used today is
to try one case at a time. However, it is not practical to
prepare all cases for trial at once and then select one at a time
for trial. Specific case preparation entails depositions of the
plaintiff, of a spouse, of treating doctors, of prescribing or
inserting doctors in the case of drugs and device; then retaining
and deposing case-specific experts (on specific causation
compared to general causation); and then Daubert motions as
to generic experts; and then summary judgment motions.59
56. Costano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 160 F.R.D. 544 (E.D. La. 1995), rev’d 84
F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996).
57. In re Beverly Hills Fire Litig., 695 F.2d 207 (6th Cir. 1982).
58. Watson v. Shell Oil Co., 979 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1992), reh’g denied
53 F.3d 663 (5th Cir. 1994).
59. RHEINGOLD, supra note 3, at C.8.
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Instead, the practice has evolved of selecting a few cases to
advance through full preparation. These cases are most
commonly referred to as bellwether cases.60 A small number of
cases are selected and advanced, while the large majority do
not move forward on discovery beyond the type of initial
disclosures mentioned previously. The aim and hope is that,
after one or several trials, enough experience develops as to
liability, causation, and damages, such as to guide the parties
to an overall settlement.61
How to select the bellwether cases is also a practical area
that has undergone some development over the years. One of
the earliest and simplest methods of selection of the bellwether
cases was to let each side pick an equal number and then to
narrow the list down through defaults, strikes, or judge
selection. However, this has tended to produce cases that are
at the extremes: the plaintiff picks a case with great sympathy,
while the defendant picks one with many defenses. The result
may be the trial of a case which is of no guidance to the merits
or value of the mass of cases. To help pick a case where the
outcome of the trial will be meaningful, more recently a few
judges have developed methods to pick typical cases, rather
than the extremes. This requires the judge to become familiar
with the “nitty gritty” of the litigation (which some just don’t
do) and the court to select a case that is down the middle. A
third method sometimes used is for the court to pick cases at
random, which may only slightly move the cases toward the
average case.
In extended litigation, the bellwether cases are often
selected in waves. A second, third, and even further round of
cases are moved along through the preparation phases,
perhaps a few months apart. This has become a judicial
method of keeping pressure on both sides of the litigation, as it
increases expense and time to manage waves of cases. The
Vioxx litigation, one of the most massive of mass torts, is an
example of the multiple wave process; since the cases were
going to trial (and both sides were winning individual cases),
the federal and state court judges kept up the pressure by
60. Id. at § 10:45.
61. See Eldon E. Fallon et al., Bellwether Trials in Multidistrict
Litigation, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2323 (2008); RHEINGOLD, supra note 3, at § 10:45.
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ordering continuing waves of new bellwethers.62
In roughly half of MTLs, one or more trials occur before a
settlement of a global nature is arrived at. The results of the
trials have a direct impact on the amount of settlement, to be
sure. The Vioxx litigation is, again, a good example of how
multiple trials can work to produce an overall settlement.63
Initially, Merck, the defendant, chose not to settle; instead, the
defendant put money into fighting these heart attack cases by
litigating each as they came to trial.64 This occurred both in
the MDL or in various state courts, New Jersey being the
primary one.65 In all, before an across-the-board settlement
The
was worked out, some sixteen cases were tried.66
defendant won about eleven of these cases, and there were
some reversals on appeal.67 With this unusually rich “data
base,” a settlement plan was arrived at, which provided about
$4.85 billion to dispose of some 35,000 cases.68
Since the judge supervising the MDL has a wealth of
knowledge about the litigation, it would be logical for that
judge to try the first cases. And while this sometimes happens,
the matter has become the subject of dispute. The statute
creating MDLs states that a case not disposed of while in the
MDL “shall” be remanded.69 In interpreting this law in 1998,
the Supreme Court held that the transferee court may not try a
case sent to it, unless with the consent of the parties.70 That
was also with the exception where the transferee court has
valid jurisdiction over a particular case because it was filed
originally in that court.71
Another method enabling the
transferee judge to try a case, even if it was not filed in its
district originally, is to do an inter-circuit transfer pursuant to
62. See supra note 2 and accompanying text; see also RHEINGOLD, supra
note 18, at § 9:39.50.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See id.
70. Lexecon v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 38
(1998).
71. Id.
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statute.72 Thus, in a recent transvaginal mesh case, the MDL
judge in West Virginia transferred a group of cases to Florida,
and went there to try them.73
B. Settlement of Mass Torts
As noted, group settlement of a mass tort litigation may
arise before the first trial, as the bellwether cases are moving
along, or after a few trial outings. In any instance, what is
discussed here is the type of settlement plan that is worked
out.
There is tremendous pressure on all participants in MDL
to settle the litigation. The judge wants the settlement not
only to end the work, but also because the disposition of a mass
tort is an achievement among the court’s peers. The defendant
usually desires this, so long as a global resolution is involved;
that is, the litigation and its costs and time-consuming nature
can be put behind it. And the lead lawyers for the plaintiffs, as
well as the individual lawyers, want it, too, in consideration of
both time and money expenditures.
The most common type of settlement in recent years has
involved some sort of schedule by which all claimants will be
paid. Sometimes a grid is agreed to between counsel, which
creates various categories into which an individual may fall.
The grids typically employ the severity of the injury, the age of
the claimant and other factors.74 Another common method is a
point system, where the claimant may obtain or lose points,
depending on factors felt to be significant to determining
damages.
Some common factors are age, length of
hospitalization, and type of outcome. Under these plans, points
may be deducted, often due to the existence of perceived risk
factors, such as smoking or obesity.75
72. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 292, 294 (2016). Some courts have experimented
with procedures to accelerate trials by trying two or more cases at once,
either with one jury, or a jury per plaintiff. See RHEINGOLD, supra note 3, at
§ 10.49.
73. See In re Boston Sci. Corp. Pelvic Repair Sys. Prods. Liab. Litig.,
Nos. MDL 2326, 2:13-CV-8669, 2015 WL 1395576, at *1 (S.D. W.Va. Mar. 25,
2015).
74. The plan is described in RHEINGOLD, supra note 3, Stryker Hip
Replacements, at § 9:39.85.
75. The plan is described in RHEINGOLD, supra note 3, NuvaRing
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Since the plaintiff must opt into the plan (unlike a class
action where one would have to opt out), defendants offering
such plans have, over recent years, utilized steps to try to get
as close to 100% of potential claimants as possible into the
plan.76 The most common step is to set a very high amount of
participation, which, if not met, will allow the defendant to
withdraw the plan (called a “walk-away” right on the part of
the defendant); a typical quota is 95%.77 However, in recent
experience, no defendant has “walked away,” even if, perhaps,
the total number did not reach that, and to the author’s
knowledge no offer of settlement by a defendant has failed on
this basis.
An added step to achieve near-total participation in a
global settlement plan has been recent attempts by a defendant
to coerce each involved law firm to put all of its cases in the
settlement plan. This practice has come to be known as an “all
or nothing” requirement. Ethical issues have been raised about
such a requirement, since individual clients might have
differing goals and demands, some doing better in the proposed
plan, some perhaps doing better if they continued to litigate.78
Although plans with an “all or nothing” requirement have
survived attack, ethical issues still remain to be resolved. One
of the arguments defendants use in supporting such
requirements are that a plaintiff’s firm will otherwise cherry
pick its best cases and hold them out and put the weaker cases,
which may form a large majority of the firm’s inventory, into
the plan.
Even short of an all or nothing demand, there is a lot of
client coerciveness in seeking a high level of participation by
clients. Plaintiffs’ counsel tend to insinuate to clients that it is
for the common good that all participate. In this they may be
backed up by support from the court, the plaintiffs’ leadership
committee who worked out the plan (and will be rewarded for
that), or a report by an “ethicist” that the plan is not unethical.
Further coercion may arise from practices that the court adopts
(supported by the defendant and plaintiff leaders) that place
Settlement, at § 7:26.50.
76. See id. at §§ 9:39.80, 9:39.85.
77. See id.
78. See discussion in RHEINGOLD, supra note 3, at § 14:13.50.
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great burdens on any plaintiff who fails to opt in and instead
wants to proceed to trial.
The role of the court in supervising and approving a mass
tort settlement has changed over time, too.
In earlier
settlements, the judge played a prominent role in approving a
settlement, perhaps as a hangover from class action litigation
where the judge was required to approve a settlement.79 What
is becoming more common these days is a private settlement
between the parties. The judge is kept informed, and may well
have pressured the parties to compromise, but the court’s role
in the end is limited to commending the plaintiffs to enter into
the settlement.80 One motive that may be in the mind of
plaintiff leaders when they opt for a private settlement is that
they are removing the judge from a potential role of
supervising the attorneys’ fees of the plaintiffs (and perhaps
putting a cap on them).81 These so-called “private settlements”
are subject to criticism because some degree of judicial
supervision may be needed, and legal issues arise among
counsel that need resolution.
Before the topic of changes in settlement practices can be
finished, several variations need to be examined.
Where implants are involved, such as hip replacements, a
two-tier practice has been developed for making payments for
the injuries caused by the devices.
This is because of
peculiarity of these devices, where there is often a basic injury
common to all cases, usually the revision of the defective device
79. Examples where courts have regulated fee contracts of individual
plaintiffs’ lawyers, with the suggestion that an MDL settlement is like a
“quasi-class” situation, include Zyprexa, RHEINGOLD, supra note 3, at § 7:47.
Other judges have apparently believed that they do not have the power to
reduce fees, or have decided not to take such steps. See Alexandra N.
Rothman, Bringing an End to the Trend: Cutting Judicial “Approval” and
“Rejection” Out of Non-Class Mass Settlement, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 319
(2011); Charles Silver & Geoffery P. Miller, The Quasi-Class Action Method of
Managing Multi-District Litigations: Problems and a Proposal, 63 VAND. L.
REV. 107 (2010).
80. RHEINGOLD, supra note 3, at § 9:69. Since there are always going to
be issues raised as to the claims, and some concept of due process survives
even in private settlements, the settlement agreement may involve the use of
special masters, who will hear and decide disputes. While these masters are
sometimes retired judges, they are not subject to further review, as would
occur in the court system.
81. See RHEINGOLD, supra note 3, at § 9:69.
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(removal of the bad device and replacement), and then some
additional complaints that may occur thereafter; these are rare
but serious events such as an infection, a heart attack, or the
need for a re-revision.82
In recent years, defendants have, on occasion, used an
approach to settlement other than across the boards nationally.
Instead, they engage in what has become known as “inventory”
settlements, approaching each firm representing plaintiffs to
work out a settlement of all of its cases. Sometimes this is
done under conditions of confidentiality so that one firm does
not learn what another is doing. In that way, firms with less
bargaining power or inside knowledge (such as is gained by
having led the discovery on behalf of plaintiffs in an MDL) may
not obtain as large an amount for their clients as others do. In
other instances, the defendant has not imposed any
confidentiality duties; the plaintiffs are free to exchange
information as to values. This openness facilitates settlement,
of course.83 This type of so-called transparency has been
lauded,84 but in reality, there is usually no full availability of
settlement values. Leaders in the litigation do not readily
share what their clients are being paid, or they may exaggerate
what they are getting (sometimes to try to get referrals).85
The inventory settlement may have its appeal to both

82. This was done, for example, in the ASR hip cases discussed in
RHEINGOLD, supra note 3, at § 9:39.80. Every claimant who has had a
revision received a base payment. Id. However, there could be reductions for
the presence of various factors, such as very short use, very long use, age, or
weight. Id. Then there may have been adverse consequences of the revision
that add damages, sometimes called enhanced or extraordinary injuries. Id.
Examples include the need for re-revision, or an infection, or dislocation, or
even a death. Here, additional set sums are paid pursuant to the plan.
83. This was done, for example, in the Yaz birth control drug litigation.
See in re Yasmin and Yaz (Drospirenone) Mktg., Sales Practices and Prods.
Liab. Litig., No. 3:09-md-02100-DRH-PMF, 2011 WL 6302287, at *1 (S.D. Ill.
Dec. 16, 2011); RHEINGOLD, supra note 3, at § 9:41.50.
84. JOSEPH W. DOHERTY ET AL., CONFIDENTIALITY, TRANSPARENCY, AND
THE U.S. CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM (2012). See Chapter 5, which discusses the
settlement in the Baycol litigation.
85. A third path, one which only occasionally eventuates, is that a
defendant selectively settles some cases and goes to trial on others (obviously
trying to pick ones it may win on compared to ones it might lose on). This
behavior is only a one-way station since eventually some plan must be
worked out.
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plaintiffs and the defendant, but it has its faults. First, there
is no judicial supervision with its potential protection of the
rights of claimants. Second, there are certain ethics pitfalls
involved: the temptation is to take a lump sum for the whole
inventory and then the plaintiffs’ firm spreads it among its
clients, which is improper.86
Additionally, as a condition for settling all of its current
inventory, the mass tort law firm may be requested not to take
on representation of new clients involving the same product,
which raises further ethics issues.87
C. Summary Judgment; Dismissal
An MDL can, of course, come to an end other than by
settlement. The transferee court can grant a motion for
summary judgment dismissing many or all of the cases in the
MDL; such a motion can be granted, in some circumstances,
where all expert testimony offered by the plaintiffs has been
struck, as a result of a prior Daubert motion.88 It can also arise
by virtue of a motion based on a legal defense, such as preemption.
Up until about five years ago, the granting of a motion that
was dispositive of all or most of the cases pending in an MDL
was a rarity. However, there recently has been an increased
use of summary judgment grants in MDL cases, ending the
MDL without payment to the plaintiffs. Recent instances of
86. There is a great amount of academic literature on aggregate
settlements. See Samuel Issacharoff & John Fabian Witt, The Inevitability of
Aggregate Settlement: An Institutional Account of American Tort Law, 57
VAND. L. REV. 1571 (2004); Sybil L. Dunlop & Steven D. Maloney, Justice is
Hard, Let’s Go Shopping! Trading Justice for Efficiency Under the New
Aggregate Settlement Regime, 83 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 521 (2009) (involving the
interpretation of Model Rule 1.8(g) of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct). See also AM. L. INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE
LITIGATION (2010); Rara Kang, Working With The Model Rules: Navigating
Ethical Dilemmas in Aggregate Settlements of Non-Class Action Mass Toxic
Tort Suits, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 585 (2014).
87. See Ronnie Gomez, Ethics Rules in Practice: An Analysis of Model
Rule 5.6(b) and Its Impact on Finality in Mass Tort Settlements, 32 REV.
LITIG. 467 (2013).
88. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); see
also in re Norplant Contraceptive Prods. Liab. Litig., 955 F. Supp. 700 (E.D.
Tex. 1997), aff’d, 165 F.3d 374 (5th Cir. 1999) (where a grant of summary
judgment as to all cases ended the litigation).
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summary judgment granted on the basis of the failure to have
expert evidence, most usually on the causation issues in the
mass of cases, are In re: Mirena IUD Products Liability
Litigation89 and In re: Zoloft (Sertraline hydrochloride)
Products Liability Litigation.90 Recent instances of summary
judgment being granted on the basis of preemption defenses
are In Re: Incretin-Based Therapies Products Liability
Litigation91 and In Re: Fosamax (Alendronate Sodium)
Products Liability Litigation.92
D. Arbitration and Mediation
A method to settle mass tort cases of occasional use is to
set up a mediation center, or expert, who hears large numbers
of cases over time. The concept is that the mediator, through
this experience, will have learned values that cases are worth
(and the defendant is willing to pay). In most instances,
individual cases settled during this mediation process. This is,
however, a slow and expensive way to settle a mass of cases.
The chief value of the mediation process, here, has been that
once some values are set—what plaintiffs will take and what
defendants will pay—a comprehensive settlement plan may be
developed, as described above.93
Mediation has also been used recently as a means of
89. In Re: Mirena IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 202 F. Supp. 3d 304 (S.D.N.Y.
2016). The court first struck the testimony of all of plaintiffs’ experts that
sought to relate the embedment of this intrauterine device to defects in
design, and then granted summary judgment. Id. at 328. The decision is on
appeal.
90. In re Zoloft (Sertraline hydrochloride) Prods. Liab. Litig., 176 F.
Supp. 3d 483 (E.D. Pa. 2016). Summary judgment was awarded to the
defendant in almost all cases pending in the MDL in 2016 based on a failure
of expert evidence to prove that the drug, when taken by pregnant women,
causes birth defects. Id. at 500-01. The decision is on appeal.
91. In Re: Incretin-Based Therapies Prods. Liab. Litig., 142 F. Supp. 3d
1108 (S.D. Cali. 2015). The decision is on appeal.
92. In Re: Fosamax (Alendronate Sodium): Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 08-08
(JAP) (LHG), 2014 WL 1266994 (D.N.J. Mar. 26, 2014). On appeal to the
Third Circuit, the Court reversed the dismissal and held that whether there
was preemption or not was a fact issue for the jury. See In Re: Fosamax
(Alendronate Sodium) Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 14-1900 et al., 2017 WL
1075047, at *24 (3d Cir. Mar. 22, 2017).
93. Mediation was the beginning point for settlement of the Stryker hip
implant litigation. See RHEINGOLD, supra note 3, at § 9.39:85.
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disposing of individual, hard-to-settle cases. Sometimes, the
judge who is supervising the overall litigation will lend a hand
doing this at the tail end of the litigation.94
E. Bankruptcy
A substantial method of resolving claims, in terms of
volume of cases disposed of, is via bankruptcy. If the defendant
has chosen to go into bankruptcy, usually Chapter 11,95 the
mass tort claims against it are carried into the bankruptcy as
claims, under well worked out but complex procedures.96 This
resolution method was extremely popular in the asbestos
litigation, where over 100 companies have gone through
bankruptcies.97 This has led to the creation of trusts to pay
claims.98 This was also true in the ephedra litigation, where
many small companies were defendants.99
But often the defendant is too big to go into bankruptcy,
and in any case the parties may prefer that the company stay
in business and continue to make money to pay settlements, or
to sell itself as a going entity.
V. How the Academic World Has Viewed and Shaped the
Development of Mass Tort Litigation
While the practitioners and judges have moved along with
handling the exigencies of often thousands of persons suing
over the same matter, they have been studied by law professors
and other academics. This is not to suggest that there is a total
divide, however. Suggestions and criticisms by academics have
had their impact upon the litigation, primarily upon the
94. Binding arbitration has rarely, if ever, been used to dispose of large
numbers of cases in a mass tort. In class actions, class-wide arbitration has
been severely limited by virtue of a line of Supreme Court decisions. See
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
95. 11 U.S.C. § 101(4)(a) (2016).
96. RHEINGOLD, supra note 3, at § 12:2.
97. Id. at § 12:46.
98. See Francis E. McGovern, The Evolution of Asbestos Bankruptcy
Trust Distribution Plans, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 163 (2006).
99. Note, for example, the Metabolife Chapter 11 bankruptcy
proceedings and the Muscletech proceedings. See RHEINGOLD, supra note 3,
at § 12:53.
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judiciary, which in turn may view the mass of litigation before
it
through
some
sort
of
jurisprudential
lens.
Some law professors have tended to see mass torts as an
aspect of “public law,” in contrast to individual law suits, which
might be labeled “private law.”100 It is the mass of cases that
transfers the MTL into the public arena. As a consequence, the
law profession, the judiciary, and the general public have
concerns for what is best for the public interest.101
But even then, there is no clear consensus on what is in
the public interest. Especially in the early days of mass tort
litigation, writers expressed concern for the rights of individual
litigants, which they feared were being submerged by collective
or aggregated forces.102 Their ideal was claimant autonomy.
Then came a strain of reasoning that the litigation was so
overwhelming, that in fact a collective or comprehensive
solution was needed for the public good. “Rough justice” might
be tolerated if an efficient system of doling out compensation
fairly might be affected. While the pendulum, in practice, has
swung decidedly in favor of the aggregative approach, tension
and concern does remain between these two poles. Further, as
the mass litigations get worked out today, both concerns for the
rights of individual claimants, and the need for efficiency and
expense reduction, coexist.
A specific aspect of the academic debate has centered on
the assurance of fairness in a settlement by assigning an
important role to the judge supervising mass tort. Since this
was “public law,” it follows that a judge will not only control
100. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
101. For an excellent, up-to-date analysis of the issues raised in this
section, see Linda S. Mullenix, Competing Values: Preserving Litigant
Autonomy in an Age of Collective Redress, 64 DEPAUL L. REV. 601 (2015). Her
article is nominally a review of a biography of Judge Jack Weinstein by
Jeffrey B. Morris. See JEFFREY B. MORRIS, LEADERSHIP ON THE FEDERAL
BENCH: THE CRAFT AND ACTIVISM OF JACK WEINSTEIN (2011).
102. See David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Tort
Exposure Cases: A ‘Public Law’ Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV.
849 (1984). Judge Jack Weinstein, a frequent commentator on the mass tort
system, also discussed these issues. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 2. The
American Law Institute has made several attempts at trying to frame
recommendations of good law in this area, the main one being AM. L. INST.,
COMPLEX LITIGATION: STATUTORY RECOMMENDATIONS AND ANALYSIS (1994),
which had little impact.
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the litigation, but also approve any settlement. Although mass
torts have moved away from class actions, where judges are
obligated to approve settlements, the professors analogize any
settlement for a large group as demanding judicial review.103
As noted in an earlier section, however, there has been a rise of
private, unsupervised settlements.
Another mass tort topic that led to considerable academic
examination and writing has been ethical issues raised about
how clients are kept informed about the litigation, how their
consent is obtained to settlements or other major steps in the
lawsuits, and whether plaintiffs’ lawyers are representing their
clients’ interests, or their own.104 That is also a topic discussed
in the practice section above. In many recent torts, it is quite
apparent that the lawyers are primarily looking out for
themselves, and that they employ rationalizations that they
are fighting for their clients in working out a multi-billiondollar settlement (with large fees).
VI. Conclusions
This overview of fifty years of development in the field of
mass torts indicates ever more sophisticated methods of
handling large number of similar cases efficiently. This does
not mean, however, that the cases are being moved along
swiftly. The mere massiveness of the litigation tends to slow
resolution down. Further, framed by the academic debate over
the need to preserve individual autonomy, there can be little
claim that individual case justice is being meted out. Clients
lack a voice and true empowerment in the workup and
settlement of the cases. Not only does the system take over,
which might be regarded as a collective necessity, but as shown
above, the attorneys take over, too, for their own financial
recovery and power.
“Rough justice” is the name sometimes given to the end
103. Linda Mullenix refers to these settlements as raising “troubling
questions about fairness, adequate representation, and the merger of
legislative, administrative, and judicial functions.” Mullenix, supra note 77,
at 611.
104. Howard M. Erichson, The Trouble with All-or-Nothing Settlements,
58 U. KAN. L. REV. 979 (2010).
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results of mass tort litigation, in the past and today as well. It
may be that there is an ideal balance between efficiency and
autonomy that is yet to be struck. However, for now, the
dynamic forces reviewed in this paper continue to make mass
tort litigation function, although at a price, at least in the
jurisprudential sense.
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